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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Protecting the United States from Cyber-
Attacks, Fake Dating Profiles, and
Employees Who Check Facebook at Work
Kristin Westerhorstmann*
ABSTRACT
Each year, the frequency and severity of cyber-attacks continue
to increase. With each new threat comes more pressure on the
government to implement an effective plan for preventing these
attacks. The first instinct has been to attempt either to enact
more laws, or to broaden the scope of already-existing laws such
as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). The CFAA,
the federal hacking statute, has been called the worst law in
technology for its excessively broad scope and vague
provisions, which have resulted in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, conflicts with the federal private nondelegation
doctrine, and in overcriminalization. In addition, significant
amendments throughout the past two decades have left the
protection of privacyonce a central interest of the original
CFAAminimalized to the point of forgotten. What was once a
narrow statute formulated to prevent hackers from stealing
government information and breaching critical infrastructure
has turned into an unrecognizably broad statute that
criminalizes common computer use such as deleting cookies,
lying about ones age on Facebook, or checking personal email
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while at work. In order to actually combat cyber-attacks, protect
peoples online interests, and remedy the problems facing the
current CFAA, this Note argues that the broad, catchall
language of the statute must be discarded to make way for a
new, more narrow, specific framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was adopted in
1986,1 the internet has grown at an unpredictable speed. What was
considered hacking in 1986 was very limited and one-dimensional, and
generally aimed only at government and business computers, which
outweighed personal computers by a ratio of three to one.2 Even simple
hacking methods used today, such as distributed-denial-of-service attacks
1 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
2 Charlotte Decker, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the United States
Criminal Code to Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 959,
960 (2010) [hereinafter Cyber Crime 2.0].
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(DDoS),3 were not fully conceptualized when the statute was enacted.
Today, personal computers substantially outweigh government
computers and the internet has shifted from being a rare commodity to a
necessary utility, so Congress has tried to respond by attempting to
extend its reach to all possible areas of computer misuse. Once a narrow
statute formulated to combat hacking threats to national security and
financial data, the CFAA is now used by prosecutors to pile on major
charges for minor crimes such as violating a websites Terms Of Service
(TOS) agreement by creating a fake online profile.4 Its wide breadth,
unclear language, and confusing application has branded the statute by
some as the worst law in technology.5
Although there are many laws that govern computers and the
internet, the CFAA is the primary statute used for hacking. The language
in 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(2)(C) prohibiting the unauthorized use of
information [obtained] from any protected computer encompasses an
immeasurable amount of illicit computer activity without making
appropriate distinctions or limitations.6 The wide breadth provided by
this language gives prosecutors extremely broad discretion, which has
led to enforcement that arbitrarily targets minor violations.7 Furthermore,
the lack of clarity has also led to a circuit split regarding its scope8 and to
questions of its constitutionality via the void-for-vagueness doctrine and
the private nondelegation doctrine.9 The CFAAs broad purpose has only
weakened its practical effect, which is now, seemingly, to arbitrarily stop
people from doing generally bad things on the internet.
In 2013, hackers stole credit and debit card data from more than 40
million Target customer accounts.10 In 2014, Community Health
Systems Inc. was the victim of an international cyber-attack that saw
3 A distributed denial-of-service attack is an attempt to make a computer or a network
unavailable to users by either crashing or flooding the service. Commonly, an attack
involves saturating the target computer or network with external communication requests
so that it cannot respond to traffic, leading to a server overload. See infra pp. 25-26.
4 See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
5 See Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, The New Yorker (Mar. 18,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology.
6 The term protected computer encompasses all computers with internet access. See
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see 18 U.S.C.
§1030(a)(2)(C); see infra pp. 5-6.
7 See infra pp. 7, 9-10, 13-14.
8 See Nosal, 676 F.3d 854; contra United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir.
2010).
9 See infra pp.8-13.
10 Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, Target Missed Signs of a Data Breach, N.Y.
Times (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/business/target-missed-
signs-of-a-data-breach.html.
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personal data and medical records, belonging to 4.5 million patients,
stolen.11 Weeks later, collections of intimate, private pictures belonging
to more than 100 celebrities, nearly all women, were stolen from their
iCloud accounts and were posted and distributed on websites such as
4chan, Imgur, Reddit, and Tumblr.12 To combat this demonstration of
both inadequate protection from cyber-attacks and ineffective methods of
apprehending hackers, Congress has sought to force people to take
computer crime more seriously by appearing tough on crime and by
appearing to take a proactive step toward taking down cyber-criminals.
An effective CFAA reform, however, must incorporate and balance three
virtual interests outlined in the statute: (1) the protection of privacy, (2)
the facilitation and allowance of a free flow of information, and (3) the
security of transactions and data.13
This Note will proceed in four Parts. Part I provides a contextual
legislative history of the CFAA relevant to the discussion of reform. It
provides background information about the harms that Congress
originally sought to protect from by its enactment in 1986, an analysis of
how those harms today have evolved to become more expansive and
complicated, and an overview of how the CFAA is used primarily today
in response. Part II examines the major issues that plague the CFAA,
including problems due to the broad, vague language of § 1030(a)(2)(C);
its tendency to delegate the power of defining criminality to private
individuals; and its failure to meet basic criminal justice and crime
control goals. Part III presents arguments set forth by advocates of a
CFAA reform, which suggest better defining terms such as
unauthorized access, as well as to address the penalization of TOS
violations. This Part also argues that these approaches offer only a quick
fix that do not adequately address the deep-rooted issues surrounding the
statute, and that an effective CFAA reform requires a more specific
framework. Finally, Part IV highlights the lack of recognition or
protection for individual privacy on the internet and discusses a need for
an express provision in the CFAA that better protects this interest. It also
11 Gail Sullivan, Chinese Hackers may have Stolen your Medical Records, The
Washington Post (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/08/19/chinese-hackers-may-have-stolen-your-medical-records/.
12 Dave Lewis, iCloud Data Breach: Hacking and Celebrity Photos, Forbes (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davelewis/2014/09/02/icloud-data-breach-hacking-
and-nude-celebrity-photos/.
13 Assuring the free flow of information, the security and privacy of data . . . are all
essential to American and global economic prosperity, security, and the promotion of
universal rights. See International Strategy for Cyberspace p. 3; see Cyber Security
Forum Initiative, Privacy, National Security, and Mass Surveillance, Tripwire (Apr. 28,
2014), http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/government/privacy-national-security-
and-mass-surveillance/.
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suggests reconstructing the statute to proscribe specific categories of
activity, and to focus more on the harms of hacking rather than build on
the current framework, which addresses merely the conduct of hacking
through a catchall provision.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: FROMNARROW STATUTE TO
WORST LAW IN TECHNOLOGY
Despite the wide breadth allotted to the CFAA today, it was
originally enacted as a very narrow statute. Congress passed an omnibus
Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1984, which included the first ever
federal computer crime statute in response to the development of the
internet and to various new technologies.14 The Act established three
new federal crimes: misusing a computer to (1) obtain national security
secrets, (2) to obtain personal financial records, or (3) by hacking into
U.S. government computers.15 Rather than the broad and mostly
ambiguous spectrum of interests the CFAA caters to today, its precursor
was tailored to specific and corresponding government interests: national
security, financial record security, and government property. The first
significant amendment to the Act came in 1986, in what was first
recognized as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.16 The amendment
detailed three additional computer crimes, prohibiting unauthorized
access (1) with the intent to defraud; (2) in damaging, altering, or
destroying information, thereby causing $1,000 or more in losses or
impairing a medical diagnosis, treatment, or care of another; or (3) in
trafficking passwords.17 Computers covered under the first two
subsections were limited to Federal interest computers, either used by
the U.S. government or financial institutions, or used by computers in
two or more states.18While this seems like a broad range of computers, it
was actually quite limited, as very few computer crimes reached over an
interstate network at the time.19
14 Sarah A. Constant, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Prosecutors Dream and
a Hackers Worst NightmareThe Case Against Aaron Swartz and the Need to Reform
the CFAA, 16 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 231, 232 (2013); see Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 1976.
15 Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
Minn. L. Rev. 1561, 1564 (2010).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1565.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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In 1986, only 8.2% of American households contained a computer.20
The internet grew out of the Defense Department and was originally a
tool for only the federal government and certain academic institutions.21
Today, 84% of American households own a computer, and 73% have an
internet connection.22 With the unprecedented and rapid expansion of
computer technology, the methods and sophistication of computer crime,
as well as the pool of people capable and willing to commit such
hacking, grew correspondingly. To combat this constantly-growing trend
of expansion, Congress passed several amendments to the CFAA, a pair
of them notoriously and dramatically widening its scope to result in the
ever-broad range of activity that the CFAA prohibits today.23
Perhaps the most dramatic amendment to the CFAA came from the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.24 The original 1984 statute provided
§ 1030(a)(2), which prohibited unauthorized access in obtaining financial
records from financial institutions, card issuers, or consumer reporting
agencies; but the 1996 amendment expanded this section to bar
unauthorized access that obtained any information of any kind, if
involved in interstate or foreign communication, effectively
criminalizing all interstate computer misuse.25 Legislative history
clarified that obtaining information included simply reading it or
viewing an image.26 The second major change came from replacing the
category of Federal interest computers with protected computers in
§ 1030(a)(2), only requiring that the computer be used in interstate
commerce, rather than be physically located in two or more states, as
well as removing the requirement that it be used by a government or
financial institution.27 Because almost every computer connected to the
Internet is used in interstate commerce by that definition, the term
protected computer covered nearly all computers with an internet
connection.
Twelve years later, the most recent significant expansion came from
the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, again
20 Cyber Crime 2.0, supra note 2 at 960.
21 Id.
22 Lee Rainie & DVera Cohn, Census: Computer Ownership, Internet Connection
Varies Widely Across U.S., Pew Research Center (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/19/census-computer-ownership-internet-
connection-varies-widely-across-u-s/.
23 See infra pp. 5-6.
24 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491.
25 Id.
26 Kerr, supra note 15, at 1567 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986) reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484 (noting that obtaining information in the statute
includes mere observation of the data)).
27 Id.; Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488.
2014-15] THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 151
triggering a heavy impact.28 First, it removed the requirement of
interstate communication under § 1030(a)(2), and effectively solidified
the CFAAs broadest section, § 1030(a)(2)(C), which prohibits any
unauthorized access to any protected computer that retrieves any
information of any kind.29 The amendment also, once again, expanded
the definition of protected computer from computers simply used in
interstate commerce, to computers used in or affecting interstate
commerce.30 Modern interpretation of the commerce clause allows
Congress to regulate any class of economic activities that in its
aggregate, simply affect interstate commerce.31 This means that the term
protected computer now applies to all computers that can be regulated
under the commerce clause, regardless if actually used in interstate
commerceessentially, all computers.
The current version of the CFAA prohibits seven types of illicit
computer activity: (1) obtaining national security information; (2)
accessing, without or by exceeding authorization, a computer and
obtaining information; (3) trespassing in a government computer; (4)
accessing a computer with intent to defraud; (5) damaging a protected
computer or data; (6) trafficking in passwords; and (7) using computers
for extortion.32 While most of the governments interests in prohibiting
hacking are enumerated in these categories, § 1030(a)(2)(C) acts
essentially as a broad catchall for all other interests recognized after
1986, including the interest in protecting privacy, serving as the response
to the exponential computer and internet growth. The increased skill and
sheer number of people capable and willing to commit these kinds of
computer crimes has led to extreme difficulty and frustration in locating
and apprehending high profile hackers.33 As a result, law enforcement
today has mostly relied on the broad scope of § 1030(a)(2)(C) to
demonstrate the CFAAs power, seemingly to save it from appearing
completely ineffective.
First, the CFAA is often used to express that the government is
tough on [computer] crime. In 2011, Aaron Swartz was charged under
the CFAA, facing up to 35 years in prison as well as a fine of up to $1
million for exceeding authorization by downloading academic articles
28 See Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 108-275,
Tit II, 122 Stat. 356.
29 Id.; Kerr, supra note 15, at 1569.
30 Id.; Kerr, supra note 15, at 1570.
31 Kerr, supra note 15, at 1570; see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
32 Constant, supra note 14, at 235.
33 The year 2014 saw an unprecedented amount of highly visible hacks and almost no
arrests or convictions of those involved. Hackers responsible for the Target breach, the
iCloud breach, and the Sony breach are all still at large. See infra pp. 24-26.
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from JSTOR.34 Despite JSTORs statements that it did not wish to see
Aaron prosecuted and the minimal, if any, harm Aaron caused, United
States Attorney Carmen Ortiz sought full repercussions to deter others
from committing similar offenses.35 Second, it is also common for law
enforcement to use the CFAA to go after, without more, those who the
government dislikes or considers unpopular. Widely known internet
troll Andrew Auernheimer, nicknamed weev, was sentenced to 41
months in prison in 2013 for noticing a hole in AT&T servers, allowing
him to collect email addresses of 110,000 iPad users, which were then
published by Gawker in redacted form.36 While weev has a long, ugly
history of internet controversy and harassment, federal prosecutors used
this incident to charge him for accessing data without authorization
under § 1030(a)(2)(C), despite the fact that AT&T made the information
publically available.37 Finally, it seems as though the government has
attempted to use the CFAA to punish non-criminal, yet morally
reprehensible, acts that just happen to involve a computer. In a widely
publicized cyberbullying case from 2009, Lori Drew created a fake
Myspace profile of a fake sixteen-year-old boy named Josh Evans, and
then made hurtful comments to a neighbor, thirteen-year-old Megan
Meier, who committed suicide later that same day.38 Because Drews
conduct did not implicate any other criminal statute, prosecutors used her
violation of Myspaces TOS agreement to bring charges under
§ 1030(a)(2)(C).39
III. ISSUES: VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS, DELEGATION, AND CRIME
CONTROL
The most common criticisms of the broad scope of the CFAA come
from its catchall provision in § 1030(a)(2)(C), and its absence of
definitions for the terms without authorization and exceed[ing]
authorized access from § 1030(a)(2). Read together, these sections
criminalize [w]hoever intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and obtains information from
any protected computer.40 This section is potentially so broad as to
classify as federal criminals those who share Netflix accounts, employees
34 Timothy P. OToole, Digital Defense: Meeting the Challenges That the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act Poses, 37-OCT Champion 44, 45 (2013).
35 Id. at 45.
36 Id. at 45-46.
37 Id.
38 Kerr, supra note 15, at 1578-79.
39 Id. at 1579-80.
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
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who check their personal email at work, or the man who violates a dating
websites TOS agreement by describing himself as tall, dark, and
handsome, when he is actually nothing of the sort.
There are generally two ways to interpret what the statute refers to as
unauthorized access. First, narrowly, this could mean accessing a
computer by circumventing its security system or breaking through code-
based restrictions.41 Second, the broader interpretation, the contract-
based approach, defines exceeding authorized access in a way that
violates norms of computer use or a contract, such as violating a
websites TOS conditions or using a work computer to access
Facebook.42 What is considered access and what makes it
unauthorized is universally unclear. This lack of clarity in the
authorization terminology often implicates the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, as well as the federal private nondelegation doctrine, while the
scope of the catchall § 1030(a)(2)(C) provision runs contrary to the goals
of the CFAA, and against basic, essential goals of crime control.
A. Void-For-Vagueness
Broadly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires Congress to
specify exactly what is prohibited. This doctrine, rooted in the Due
Process Clause, is designed to combat the traditional problems suffered
by vague statutes, including arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
problems of notice, and apparent irrationality or absurdity.43 Void-for-
vagueness questions are evaluated based on two inquiries. First, whether
the law is so vague and standardless that the public is unsure of what it
prohibits, in which it leaves courts free to decide what is prohibited in
each particular case.44 The second inquiry addresses arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, asking whether the statute establishes
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.45 Rather than its effect
on the public, this test focuses on how much discretion the statute gives
to police. If the statute leaves enforcement up to the whim of any police
officer, it is unconstitutionally vague.46
41 Kerr, supra note 15, at 1571-72.
42 Id.
43 The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private
Nondelegation, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 751, 751 (2010) [hereinafter Private Nondelegation].
44 Kerr, supra note 15, at 1573 (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402
(1966)).
45 Id. at 1574 (quoting Kolender v Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
46 Id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)); An anti-
gang congregation ordinance in Chicago prohibited people from remain[ing] in any one
place with no apparent purpose.The Court deemed the ordinance unconstitutionally
vague because apparent purpose does not have a common meaning that an ordinary
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In one of the most infamous cases involving the CFAA, a Federal
District Court in California overturned a conviction for creating a fake
Myspace profile in United States v. Drew via the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.47 The governments theory was that Lori Drews creation of the
false profile, Josh Evans, had violated Myspaces TOS conditions,
which rendered her access to Myspaces network without authorization
under § 1030(a)(2)(C).48 TOS contracts are written at the complete
discretion of the website creator, are long and mostly unread by the vast
majority of users, and are subject to change without prior notice or
without any notification whatsoever. To extend § 1030(a)(2)(C) to
simple TOS violations would have required permitting the
criminalization of otherwise lawful conduct solely based on an
agreement between private parties, subject to change at any time.
Although the court did not explicitly agree with this particular line of
reasoning, it held that under this interpretation,  . . . federal law
enforcement entities would be improperly free to pursue their personal
predilections, and that all manner of situations could be prosecuted.49
The court in Drew took the more narrow approach to defining the
authorization terminology to save the statute from being
unconstitutionally vague, however, not all courts have followed suit. The
Fifth Circuit in United States v. John took the broader interpretation of
exceeds authorization, by holding that an employee violates
§ 1030(a)(2)(C) when she uses her work computer beyond the scope of
employment.50 The court, relying on an agency approach to
interpretation, held that the CFAA prohibited both unauthorized
acquisition of information from a computer and information obtained
after authorized use but which is outside the realm of authorization.51 As
discussed again in United States v. Nosal by the Ninth Circuit, this
interpretation allows for criminalizing any kind of non-work related
computer access, such as checking personal email.52
person would know with regard to whether or not their conduct violated the ordinance. In
addition, the ordinance would provide absolute discretion to police officers to determine
which actions were without an apparent purpose. see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality opinion).
47 See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
48 Id. at 453; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
49 Id. at 467.
50 See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that an employee
had exceeded authorized access when she provided another company customer accounts,
in the form of scanned images of checks or printouts of computer screens, belonging to
the company of which she was employed with at the time).
51 Id.
52 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that
an employee does not violate the CFAA when he violates the company computer terms of
2014-15] THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 155
One of the leading proponents of CFAA reform, Professor Orin Kerr,
argues that the wide scope requires courts to adopt the narrow
interpretation to avoid invalidating the statute completely, precisely
because of the surprisingly uncertain meaning of access without
authorization and exceeds authorized access as well its remarkable
breadth.53 Because the scope of the CFAA falls entirely on the meaning
of unauthorized access, courts must adopt the definition that does not
criminalize common use of computers because this would give police the
power to arbitrarily arrest any typical protected computer user at their
discretion.54 However, even a narrow reading of the statute would
present many of the same overcriminalization problems that run afoul of
the interests and goals of the statute.
B. Delegation
In addition to the void-for-vagueness doctrine, challenges to the
scope of the CFAA can be framed under the federal private
nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine prevents Congress
from delegating federal lawmaking power to self-interested,
unsupervised, and democratically unaccountable private parties.55 The
Supreme Court originally addressed this issue in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co. in 1936, although lower courts have since identified three primary
factors that drive the question of whether or not a statute violates the
private nondelegation doctrine:56 First, whether the delegation of power
authorizes private actors to make a law in a non-neutral, transparent
way;57 second, whether affected parties are adequately represented in the
private lawmaking process;58 and finally, the analysis asks whether the
state retains control over the private delegate, which seems to be the
most important factor.59 For example, courts will typically allow a
delegation of rule-making power that is subject to governmental
approval, disapproval, or modification, which allows the government to
retain responsibility.60 In contrast with all of these factors, a broad
reading of the CFAA delegates lawmaking power directly to private
website creators, allowing them complete latitude to create, modify, or
use agreement by downloading highly confidential and proprietary data for purposes of
starting a competing business); contra John, 597 F.3d 263.
53 Kerr, supra note 15, at 1562.
54 Id. at 1577.
55 Private Nondelegation, supra note 43, at 761.
56 Id. at 763-64; see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
57 Id. at 764-65.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 766; see Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
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delete sections of their TOS agreements without any notice or
notification to users.
Most notably from the opinion in Drew, the court explicitly stated it
was not deciding whether or not Congress could base criminal liability
on violations of a company or websites computer use restrictions, but
rather on the particular issues of notice and potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement presented specifically by the unclear
language of the statute.61 The CFAA as written, given the lack of clear
definitions, may violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine, although if the
Supreme Court were to set a clear precedent via even the broadest
interpretation, this could cure the vagueness. In this scenario, or under
any broad reading of unauthorized access, it may be appropriate to frame
the challenge as violating the private nondelegation doctrine. At a
minimum, courts have required at least some kind of review or
collaboration with government to assure fair and rational restrictions,
while TOS agreements or employee computer use stipulations involve
none whatsoever.62 These essentially-unilateral contracts also establish
significant disparities in power between TOS drafters and service users.63
For example, users must agree to Facebooks TOS conditions before they
are able to create an account. Users have no negotiation power if they
oppose the terms, and Facebook has no affirmative duty to alert users
when these terms change. Additionally, whether or not the contract
drafters will exercise power fairly and transparently is completely at the
will of the drafter. Undoubtedly, not all user agreements and employee
computer usage rules are one-sided or unfair, but there is no way to
distinguish these under the CFAA from those that would abuse their
broad power to impose arbitrary violations that would be considered
federal crimes.64
C. Interests and Crime Control
Since the CFAA was first enacted, the sheer number of hackers have
grown and their methods have evolved, so Congress has responded by
adding new sections to the CFAA that reflect a need for additional
protection for the sake of its interests, which can now loosely be
considered security, both national and of financial data and transactions;
privacy; and a free flow of information. While most of the additional
sections can be traced directly back to interests in security or a free flow
of information, or sometimes both, the development of the catchall
61 Id. at 756; see United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
62 Id. at 770.
63 Id. at 771.
64 Id.
2014-15] THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 157
language in § 1030(a)(2)(C) seems to be Congress only answer to both
protecting privacy, and generally, to controlling the continuously
growing internet. By generally prohibiting unauthorized access and
obtaining information from protected computers, rather than creating
new sections, § 1030(a)(2)(C) gives broad power for the law to reach
whatever future hazards may arise, and with it simply an implied
protection for privacy. Despite this presumed intention, this language is
egregiously overinclusive and broad, and without specific parameters it
criminalizes almost all computer misuse.
Aaron Swartz wrote a script that allowed him to quickly download a
large number of articles from JSTOR, presumably with the intent to
make them freely available to the public.65 Rather than hack into or
circumvent JSTORs system, Aaron used his authorized access as a
student to download articles.66 Despite JSTORs refusal to pursue the
case or to press civil charges, the United States Attorneys office charged
Aaron with thirteen felony counts, including wire fraud and computer
fraud under the CFAA, largely due to the fact that he simply used fake
names and IP addresses to conceal his identity.67 Facing charges that
carry a penalty of up to 35 years in prison and a $1,000,000 fine, Aaron
committed suicide in his apartment shortly before proceedings began.68
Similarly, weevs AT&T follies were intended to highlight AT&Ts
faulty network security and to demonstrate its carelessness in protecting
its customers personal information.69 Like Aaron, weev did not bypass
any kind of security system or obtain passwords, but merely noticed the
hole that was leaking email addresses.70 After Gawker published the
email addresses in redacted form, AT&T closed the hole and notified its
customers.71 weev was convicted in New Jersey for accessing data, the
email addresses, without authorization under § 1030(a)(2)(C).72
In an interesting twist, the Department of Justice recently used the
exact same tactic as weev, collecting information through a leak, to
locate and prosecute Ross Ulbricht, the apparent mastermind behind an
illegal narcotics website called Silk Road.73 In Auernheimer, the DOJ
65 Constant, supra note 14, at 241-43.
66 Id. at 240.
67 Id. at 241-42.
68 Id. at 242-43.
69 OToole, supra note 34, at 45.
70 Id. at 45-46.
71 Id.
72 The Third Circuit eventually dismissed his conviction because New Jersey was an
improper venue. Id. at 46.
73 See Orin Kerr, Does Obtaining Leaked Data from a Misconfigured Website Violate
the CFAA?, The Washington Post (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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argued that public data on a server was protected if an ordinary user
could not find it and if it was not intended to be seen by the public.74 In
the Silk Road case, however, the DOJ has expressed the opinion that
there is nothing unlawful about taking advantage of a server
misconfiguration to obtain data inadvertently leaked by the server
because that information is fully accessible to the public.75 The disparity
in these two conflicting statements, spoken less than two years apart,
illustrates perfectly how the vague and broad language of the CFAA is
used to give complete discretion to law enforcement and the government
to decide exactly which ambiguous violation to criminalize. The court
in Nosal, referring to Drew, foresaw this difficulty when it explained:
Its not clear we can trust the government when a tempting target comes
along . . . The difference between puffery and prosecution may depend
on whether you happen to be someone an AUSA has reason to go
after.76
In another somewhat ironic twist, the broad language of the CFAA,
in its current form, prohibits techniques that users commonly utilize to
protect their own privacy, and to enhance their computer security.
Deleting cookies is a popular method in both maintaining privacy and
computer security. Cookies are essentially trackers that websites use to
monitor user activity, especially searches, preferences, and page visits.77
In addition to burdening user privacy and security, cookies also slow
computer speed.78 Cookies are commonly used by websites for targeted
advertising based on searches or clicks, or for their paywalls.79 For
example, The New York Times, which imposes a 10 articles-per-month
limit for nonsubscribers, uses cookies to track the number of articles a
particular user has read.80 This limit is easily circumvented by deleting
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/08/does-obtaining-leaked-data-from-a-misconfigur
ed-website-violate-the-cfaa/.
74 Id.; see U.S. v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3rd Cir. 2014).
75 Id.
76 OToole, supra note 34, at 48 (quoting United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859
(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (referring to United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal.
2009))).
77 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Must Allow
Anonymity and Privacy to Protect the Security of Ordinary Users and Promote Human
Rights Around the Globe, https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cfaa-privacy-anonymity.pdf.




80 Id.; see also Jennifer Granick, Thoughts on Orin Kerrs CFAA Reform Proposals: A
Great Second Step, The Center for Internet and Society (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/thoughts-orin-kerrs-cfaa-reform-proposals-
great-second-step.
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cookies periodically, as the FTC even recommends.81 It is by no means a
stretch to consider exceeding the 10 articles-per-month limit, even
unintentionally, by deleting cookies as unauthorized access under the
CFAA. Additionally, not all hacking is malicious, some even benevolent.
In fact, it is common for companies to offer rewards, or bug bounties
for hackers who can successfully circumvent their security system due to
a flaw, or bug, and then bring it to their attention.82 Under the CFAA,
there is no way to distinguish these white hat hackers, from those with
more sinister black hat motives.
Finally, the catchall language from § 1030(a)(2)(C) is much too
broad and inconsistently enforced to provide any kind of deterrence. The
CFAAs deterrent effect is analogous to deterrence due to laws
proscribing media downloading. With dozens of downloading host
websites and torrent software, incredibly difficult to find moderators and
creators of websites,83 and plenty of willing users, the government has
found it nearly impossible to deter and control the millions of people
who, often on a daily basis, illegally download or upload media.84 Traffic
laws illustrate a similar principle. Not even the most law-abiding citizen
could claim she obeys every traffic law, all of the time. Traffic laws are
analogous to the CFAA because it is difficult to drive 10 miles without
violating a traffic law, while it is also difficult to click a mouse ten times
in a row without violating the CFAA. In either scenario, the government
cannot hope to deter violations without consistent enforcement, and in
the CFAAs case, narrower provisions.
81 Id.
82 Rather than use internet security companies to protect their data, some websites offer
bug bounties for any hacker who can successfully circumvent their security system,
and then bring it to their attention to be patched. Parisa Tabriz, a white-hat hacker in
charge of Google Chromes security, helped introduce the bug bounty system to Google
which allows hackers from the larger community to help recognize flaws and to patch
them. See Josie Ensor, This Security Princess is Googles Secret Weapon, Business
Insider (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/this-security-princess-is-googles-
secret-weapon-2014-10.
83 Peter Sunde, the co-founder of popular media file-sharing website, ThePirateBay,
was not apprehended until in 2014, eleven years after the website was first launched in
2003. ThePirateBay was also shut down briefly in the same year, but was re-opened
shortly after. See Nolan Feeny, Pirate Bay Co-Founder Arrested in Sweden, Time (Jun. 1,
2014), http://time.com/2804948/pirate-bay-peter-sunde-arrested/.
84 An online-piracy survey from 2011 indicated that 95% of music downloaded online
is illegal, that more than 75% of computers contained at least one downloaded illegal
application, and that websites hosting pirated content receive more than 136 million
visitors per day. Despite these overwhelming statistics, it is rare for illegal downloaders to
be charged or convicted. This is mostly because the highly sought after hosts and
moderators are very difficult to locate, often taking years of hard work and resources to
find. See Online Piracy in the Numbers, Go-Gulf (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.go-
gulf.com/blog/online-piracy/.
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IV. CURRENT CFAAREFORM PROPOSALS
Every year, cyber-attacks become more common, more visible, and
more damaging, and coupled with an inability to locate and apprehend
those involved, it has sparked an urgent outcry for a cybersecurity reform
in the United States. While government reform activists find the answer
in even further broadening the scope of the CFAA and increasing its
penalties, almost all non-government proponents of a reform agree that
narrowing the statute and focusing on its actual interests would be much
more effective in regulating cyber-crime.85 A reform could come from
either Congress passing another amendment, or from the Supreme Court
invalidating the statute all together or choosing a clear interpretation.86
Unfortunately, it does not seem like Congress has taken any initiative to
attempt to narrow or refine the statute, and have instead swung the
opposite way for fear of appearing soft on crime, as well as to project
the assertion that they are capable of preventing attacks.
A. Aarons Law
Although distant calls for a CFAA reform have been around for a
while, Aaron Swartzs tragic death in 2011 was the catalyst that sparked
a heated discussion and a movement toward making a change. Only four
days after Aarons death, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.)
announced that she was proposing changes to the CFAA, which in 2013
would come to be appropriately titled, Aarons Law.87 The final draft
of the proposal explicitly calls for excluding crimes from the CFAA that
amount to a breach of contract, such as violating a websites TOS
conditions, as well as to exclude efforts to prevent identification of a
computer user, such as changing an IP or MAC address.88 Specifically
Aarons Law would replace the phrase exceeds authorized access with
access without authorization, defined as knowingly obtaining or
altering information from a protected computer that the accesser lacks
authorization to obtain or alter, by circumventing one or more
technological measures designed to exclude unauthorized individuals
85 See infra, pp. 16-20.
86 See Kerr, supra note 15, at 1562-63.
87 Constant, supra note 14, at 244.
88 Id.; see alsoMark Jaycox, et al., Aarons Law Introduced: Now is the Time to
Reform the CFAA, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Jun. 20, 2013), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2013/06/aarons-law-introduced-now-time-reform-cfaa.
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from obtaining that information.89 This essentially codifies the Ninth
Circuits holding in United States v. Nosal.90
Tor Ekeland, one of weevs attorneys, has stated, [a]mending the
definition of unauthorized access to exclude [TOS] violations is just
putting a band aid on a gaping, gushing wound.91 While the
criminalization of TOS violations is one of the largest problems of the
CFAA, it certainly is not the only problem. This scheme does not
distinguish between circumventing serious security protections and
working around minor annoyances, and thus leaves the government still
free to pursue relatively benign misuse such as deleting cookies.
Additionally, Aarons Law provides a definition of access without
authorization that runs into the same problems as the current definition
of exceeds authorized access. Both definitions basically state that a
person is not allowed to do what they are not authorized to do, but it is
still unclear of what a person is authorized to do, subjecting it to the
same vagueness issues as the current CFAA.92 Also notable is that
Aarons Law gives no consideration to the overinclusive, broad, and
illusive privacy protections found in § 1030(a)(2)(C).
B. Orin Kerrs Code-Based System
At the forefront of CFAA reform proposals lies Orin Kerrs code-
based restriction test.93 Fundamentally, Kerr proposes that courts
interpret access broadly, but limit the phrase without authorization to
the circumvention of code-based restrictions.94 He suggests that access
be defined as whenever a user sends a command or information and the
computer executes it; essentially, any successful interaction with a
89 Mark Jaycox, et al., Aarons Law Introduced: Now is the Time to Reform the CFAA,
Electronic Frontier Foundation (Jun. 20, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/
06/aarons-law-introduced-now-time-reform-cfaa.
90 See 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(C).
91 Andy Greenberg, Aarons Law Suggests Reforms to Computer Fraud Act (But Not
Enough to Have Protected Aaron Swartz), Forbes (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/01/16/aarons-law-suggests-reforms-to-hacking-acts-but-
not-enough-to-have-protected-aaron-swartz/.
92 Orin Kerr, Drafting Problems with the Second Version of Aarons Law from Rep.
Lofgren, The Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 2, 2013), http://volokh.com/2013/02/02/drafting-
problems-with-the-second-version-of-aarons-law-from-rep-lofgren/.
93 See Orin Kerr, Cybercrimes Scope: Interpreting Access and Authorization in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1596 (2003); see also, Kerr, Investigating
and Prosecuting 21st Century Cyber Threats, United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigators (Mar. 13,
2013).
94 Id. at 1598-99.
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computer.95 Kerr balances the broad definition of access with a much
narrower definition of without authorization.96 There are generally two
ways that a user can exceed privileges on a computer: by breaching a
regulation by contract or by circumventing regulation by code,
essentially tricking the computer into giving the user more privileges
than entitled.97 Kerr proposes to limit access without authorization to
only those that circumvent code, and to ensure that breaches of
regulation by contract be insufficient to hold a user criminally liable.98
Kerrs proposal does the best job of curing many of the broadness
and vagueness issues that make the current CFAA problematic. Limiting
unauthorized access to only those who circumvent code limits the
governments ability to arbitrarily prosecute people who it does not like,
or people whose acts just happen to involve a computer. The code-based
system also draws a balanced line between openness and privacy and
security that allows users to visit websites without the fear and the
chilling effect of potential prosecution arising from a breach of an
arbitrary TOS contract. Additionally, it encourages users to protect their
privacy and security in a more technically effective way, rather than by
contractual agreements which essentially operate on the honor system, by
prodding them to lock away data and protect their networks via code-
based barriers such as a password gate.
The inherent problem, however, with this method of protecting
privacy is that, much like in the physical world, it is reserved only for
people who have the skill and resources to implement these barriers.99 In
fact, this is analogous to limiting the protections of physical trespass to
only those who have a fence or a wall around their property. It puts the
burden on the user to implement a code-based barrier that encompasses
all of her privacy and security concerns, which may require extra costs
and requisite skill that may be unavailable. To require the entire wide
range of internet users to become technologically literate enough to
implement code-based barriers in order to protect their private data or
information is contrary to the democratic ideology of the United States.
95 A broad definition of access is necessary in the current environment where the
internet and technology change so rapidly and where a typical user may inadvertently
communicate with five different servers just by checking her email, which might force
courts to draw lines to determine exactly how much access is sufficient to implicate the
CFAA. Id. at 1619-21.
96 Id. at 1622-24.
97 Circumvention may occur by using another users, with greater privileges, username
and password, or by exploiting an error in the software. Id. at 1599-60.
98 Id. at 1596.
99 See David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA
Intent Requirement, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 907, 943-44 (2013).
2014-15] THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 163
Additionally, merely favoring code-based circumvention as the
baseline for defining without authorization does not solve the
delegation problem.100 Rather than by setting the terms of the contract, it
still allows private individuals to define what conduct makes a user a
federal criminal by implementing code-based barriers.101 The only
difference is that users will constantly be on notice of when their activity
is without authorization because they will be physically blocked by a
code barrier.102 The code-based test also begs the question: what does it
mean to circumvent? In the previous New York Times example, would a
user circumvent the paywall barrier by deleting their cookies after their
10-articles a month limit has been reached? JSTOR permitted MIT
students to download a certain number of articles before the service
would block that users IP address.103 Did Aaron Swartz circumvent
JSTORs code-based barrier by changing his IP address? Outrage over
the way Aarons prosecution was handled shows that very few felt that
his actions amounted to a federal crime.
C. 2013 House Judiciary Draft
In 2013, the House Judiciary Committee proposed a bill that would
amend the CFAA in significant ways.104 Under the draft bill, virtually
any offense under § 1030(a)(2) would be considered a felony, including
the ever-broad protected computer language.105 At present, violations
of this section constitute a felony only when (1) the offense was
committed for purposes of financial gain, (2) the offense was committed
in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act, or (3) the value of
information obtained exceeds $5,000.106 In addition, the new bill would
treat violations of this section as a felony if the offense involves
information obtained from a computer used by or for a government
entity, and also increases most of the maximum statutory penalties,
including increasing the statutory maximum for the section that Aaron
Swartzs conduct would have fallen under.107
100 See Private Nondelegation, supra note 43.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See Jennifer Granick, Thoughts on Orin Kerrs CFAA Reform Proposals: A Great
Second Step, Center for Internet and Society (Jan. 13, 2013), http://cyberlaw.
stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/thoughts-orin-kerrs-cfaa-reform-proposals-great-second-step.
104 Peter J. Toren & Weisbrod Matteis, Amending the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
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The proposal to turn virtually all violations of § 1030(a)(2) into
felonies is a significant change. Since prosecutors are somewhat reluctant
to charge misdemeanors for a variety of reasons, this change is likely to
lead to an increase in prosecuting run-of-the-mill violations of the
CFAA. Also, because the draft bill makes no effort to address the
problematic vague and broad language, the increase in prosecutions
would almost certainly be aimed at the CFAAs current favorite target,
unpopular people on the internet. Although deterrence is often cited as a
justification for such harsh consequences, when the unclear and vast
range of prohibited conduct is to blame for the lack of the deterrence, the
solution would seemingly lie in clarity and narrower tailoring rather than
in simply increasing already draconian penalties. It is not difficult to
imagine the level of abuse the 2013 House Judiciary Draft would initiate.
V. A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
While it might be hard to imagine why Congress would feel that the
CFAAs broad reach needs to be extended further, the 2013 House
Judiciary Draft is hardly the first, and nor will it be the last proposed
piece of legislation to call for these changes. The growing threat and
current phenomenon of damaging and visible cyberattacks, coupled with
the startling lack of results in apprehending major hackers is primarily
what has prompted government action. The rush of action taken to
combat hacking threats to the United States is comparable to the
response after the September 11th World Trade Center attacks. Because
the September 11th hijackings were so visible, damaging, and
emotionally jarring, the public looked to the United States government
for an immediate response or solution. Rather than appear to do nothing,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) almost immediately
increased its airport security regulations.108 TSA regulations are
notorious and have been heavily criticized for being invasive, costly,
incompetent, and ineffective in locating terrorists or hijackers, yet they
give the public the illusion of safety.109
Expanding the CFAAs scope would have the similar effect of
appearing to the public that the government is being proactive or
aggressive in its effort to stop cyberattacks, but an expansion would do
very little in practice to stop real hacking threats. If anything, expanding
the scope of the CFAA would divert valuable resources into prosecuting
arbitrary TOS violations, which could instead be used for locating and
108 See Charles C. Mann, Smoke Screening, Vanity Fair (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112.
109 Id.
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apprehending notoriously difficult to find, damaging, black hat
hackers. While there is strong pressure to take some kind of action in
response to recent cybersecurity failures, the government must move
away from simply editing or building on the vague and unclear language
of the current CFAA and reconstruct it specifically to respect and
balance the CFAAs interests, to target actual wrongdoers and real
harms, and to endorse specific frameworks.110
A. Balancing Interests: The Case for Privacy
First and foremost, any effective CFAA reform needs to include a
stronger, and an express privacy provision. Despite the fact that
§ 1030(a)(2)(C) was included in the CFAA specifically to protect
privacy, the interest is nearly always placed on the backburner or simply
not recognized at all.111 For example, the government reacted very
strongly when members of online hacktivist group, Anonymous,
launched a series of DDoS attacks that disrupted and destroyed the
Church of Scientologys ability to communicate online.112 Additionally,
intrusions into government or military computers are treated with the
utmost urgency and severity yet invasions of non-government related
privacy are seen as a second tier priority, and sometimes even considered
a mitigator when only contact or personally identifiable information is
compromised.113
Furthermore, even when privacy is given some kind of recognition in
regards to the CFAA, it is most often in reference to financial, rather than
individual, privacy. In 2014, JPMorgan Chase was the victim of a
massive hack that compromised the private information of 76 million
account holders.114 The attack was targeted at financial data, but instead,
hackers were only able to obtain names, addresses, phone numbers,
110 See Steven Titch, Four Principles for Effective Cybersecurity Law and Policy,
RStreet (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.rstreet.org/2014/04/25/four-principles-for-effective-
cybersecurity-law-and-policy/.
111 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7 (1996)(The bill would amend section
1030(a)(2) to increase protection for privacy and confidentiality of computer
information.); S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986)(the premise of this subsection is
privacy protection . . . ); Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
13 U. Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Poly 1 (2012).
112 The group launched a series of damaging online attacks against the Church of
Scientology, titled Project Chanology, an attempt to expel the Church of Scientology
from the internet. Patrick Barkham, Hackers Declare War on Scientologists Amid Claims
of Heavy-Handed Cruise Control, The Guardian (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2008/feb/04/news.
113 See infra pp. 21-22.
114 David E. Sanger et al., White House Monitored JPMorgan Breach with Alarm, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 8, 2014).
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and email addresses of consumers.115 Rather than seriously address the
fact that significant, private information was stolen from millions of
people, both the government and JPMorgan were much more concerned
that the companys internet security system was breached in general, and
were purely relieved that no financial data was compromised.116 In fact,
under both federal and state law, JPMorgan did not even have to alert
customers about the attack because only contact information was
breached.117 The cavalier attitude toward violations of individual
privacy, backed-up by the lack of recognition from CFAA itself, sets a
dangerous precedent of belittling and devaluing privacy, which is
especially concerning in the era of the internet. The lack of an express
privacy provision in § 1030(a)(2)(C) directly endorses this attitude by
giving the impression that privacy can be efficiently protected by simply
being thrown in with the rest of the immeasurable myriad activities
covered by the catchall provision.
There is a common belief that once something has been uploaded,
posted, or written on the internet, it is there forever. Put more
precisely, it is common for people to argue that there is no expectation of
privacy online; however, this is not entirely true. Consumers enter their
credit card information into websites all the time and absolutely expect it
to remain private. It seems that this common belief is only applicable
when personal information is at issue. In 2014, a significant amount of
private, intimate pictures were stolen from over 100 celebrity women and
were posted and widely distributed on the internet.118 These pictures
were all stolen via their iCloud accounts, which contained data that had
been automatically transferred from their phones.119 As expected, the
iCloud breach added more fuel to the cybersecurity discussion, although
in this instance, parties jumped to place blame squarely on the victims
and to say that the debate should be more focused on the actual conduct
of hacking rather than the extremely personal and invasive information
that was stolen.120
Additionally, individual privacy needs to be better protected in the








120 SeeMary Anne Franks, The Internets Privacy Hypocrisy, Daily Dot (Sept. 3, 2014).
http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/celebgate-privacy-hypocrisy-nude-photos-nsa-edward-
snowden/.
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online privacy threats that do not have a physical world equivalent. In the
physical world, constantly monitoring, following, and watching
someones every move presumably requires a great deal of effort and
time. Online, a typical user can accumulate countless amounts of
spyware, malware, viruses, cookies, and other tracking software in a
single day that can monitor and may allow recording of their every
keystroke or Google search. While in the real world, this activity would
probably be more aptly called stalking, in the online world, this is simply
routine. Technology makes it immeasurably easier to track someone
online or to discover private information about them. Simply the fact that
violations that involve financial data or the disruption of information are
met with panic and outrage, while these types of privacy violations are
seen as normal or expected is evidence enough that individual privacy
must be better addressed and balanced in the CFAA.
Not only is individual online privacy largely ignored by the CFAA,
but it is currently being threatened and further minimalized by new
proposed cybersecurity, information-sharing, legislation such as the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA),121 and even by popular
CFAA reform proposals that seek to narrow its scope. For example,
Kerrs proposal allows users to protect their privacy only when they have
constructed code-based barriers around it.122 This is essentially a form of
conditional privacy, only reserved for those who are technologically
savvy enough to implement these barriers. Those who are not are left
with the choice between using the internet and adequately protecting
their privacy, which, in the era of the internet, is not a choice at all.
Privacy is a recognized fundamental right, and a right recognized as a
protected interest by the CFAA.123 In order for this right to be taken
seriously and respected, it needs to be addressed in a strong, express
privacy provision.
121 CISA seeks to solve the cybersecurity crisis by encouraging information sharing
between businesses and the government by protecting businesses from lawsuits if they
share cyber threat indicators with the government. Cyber threat indicators can come
from as little as a user connecting to StarbucksWi-Fi while that user has spyware on his
computer. The bill also does not require personal information to be removed before data
is shared with the government unless there is verifiable knowledge that the information is
present. Much like proposals to expand the CFAA, this legislation comes as a hasty
response to the imminent threat of cyber-crime that emulates the common theme of
sacrificing privacy for security, and sometimes for just the illusion of security.
122 See Thaw, supra note 99, at 943-44.
123 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also supra note 112.
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B. Targeting Wrongdoers
Although much about the internet, cybersecurity, and the CFAA is
murky, it is abundantly clear that real and extremely destructive cyber-
threats do actually exist, and very little has been effective in preventing
these attacks. These actual, dangerous threats can broadly be divided into
three categories.124 The first category, as illustrated by the Target breach
in 2013, the Home Depot breach a year later, and countless others who
have fallen victim to this particular motivation, encompasses theft or
fraud that is financially- or profit- motivated.125 This kind of breach
mostly involves commercial businesses or banks, and affects both the
targeted company and the individuals whose information is stolen. Many
times, breaches of this category are very large and visible, sometimes
affecting millions of consumers. Like most forms of serious hacking, the
government has found it incredibly difficult to apprehend hackers who
steal financial information.126
The second category includes hackers who seek to acquire private or
protected information through espionage.127 This can include attaching
viruses, spyware, or malware to specific, or a series of, computers, and
can also include simply stealing or guessing passwords to access private
data. This particular threat affects all internet users across the board,
from government computer users, to individual users, to businesses, and
to the military. In addition to the aforementioned iCloud breach and the
Community Health Systems breach, an international hacker group
managed to break into Sony Pictures network, also in 2014, and steal a
number of unreleased films as well a multitude of company emails,
which were published and circulated online.128 The incident caused the
suspended release of the movie, The Interview, and the resignation of
co-chair Amy Pascal due to several of her personal emails being made
public.129 Even the White House has not been immune to hackers
searching for private information.130
124 Titch, supra note 110.
125 See Harris & Perlroth, supra note 10; see Robin Sidel, Home Depots 56 Million
Card Breach Bigger Than Targets, Wall Street Journal (Sept. 18, 2014).
http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets-1411073571.
126 See supra note 33.
127 Titch, supra note 110.
128 See Lewis, supra note 12; see Sullivan, supra note 11; see Kim Zetter, Sony Got
Hacked Hard: What We Know and Dont Know so Far, Wired (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/.
129 Kim Zetter, Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Dont Know so Far, Wired
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/12/sony-hack-what-we-know/.
130 In October of 2014, representatives admitted that the White House network had been
breached, believing the attack was state-sponsored. White House Computer Network
Hacked, BBC News (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29817644.
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Finally, the third legitimate threat to cybersecurity includes
disruption or destruction designed to cause harm through an attack that
slows, disables, or destroys essential systems.131 This type of cyberattack
is commonly orchestrated through DDoS attacks.132 DDoS attacks are a
preferred weapon of hacktivist groups, because they are very effective
and are extremely easy to launch.133 The purpose of these attacks is to
overload the server and to render the target victim unable to
communicate online.134 It is estimated that in 2014, there were 28 DDoS
attacks every hour.135 Popular targets of DDoS attacks include websites
hosted on high-profile servers such as banks or credit card payment
gateways, as well as business competitors, although they can technically
happen to anyone.136 In a very publicized cyberattack from 2011, two
members of the infamous hacking group, LulzSec, launched a DDoS
attack that took down the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
website in the United Kingdom, and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) website in the United States.137
Much of what is proscribed and prosecuted today by the CFAA does
not fall into one of these categories. The sliding scale allotted by the
unauthorized access language allows benign or trivial conduct, which
amounts to no real harm, to be criminalized, and turns non-hacker
computer users into federal criminals.138 Aaron Swartz may have used a
minor workaround to get access to JSTOR articles, but the harm
stemming from his conduct is still unclear, even to JSTOR, the alleged
victim of Aarons attack.139 Similarly, Lori Drews motivation,
although perhaps petty and malicious, was not a motive that has sparked
fear in the hearts of those concerned with computer crime. Today, the
131 See Titch, supra note 110.
132 Generally, this method involves taking over bot or zombie computers to
overload the target computer with external communication requests. Deepanker Verma,
LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon)DOS Attacking Tool, InfoSec Institute (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/loic-dos-attacking-tool/.
133 DDoS attacks are commonly launched via the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC)
application, which was originally adapted as a stress testing device for website traffic.
Launching an attack or a stress test is as easy as downloading the application and
inputting the link to the target website. Id.
134 Id.
135 NSFOCUS Information Technology Co., Ltd., DDos Threat Report 2013.
136 Verma, supra note 132.
137 The group has also taken responsibility for attacks against News International, Sony,
Nintendo, the Arizona State Police, 20th Century Fox, HBGary Federal, Infragard,
Bethesda, Eve Online, and many others. Fahmida Y. Rashid, LulzSec Duo Plead Guilty to
DDoS Against CIA, SC Magazine (Jun. 25, 2012), http://www.scmagazine.com/lulzsec-
duo-plead-guilty-to-ddos-against-cia/article/247284/.
138 See Constant, supra note 14.
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government looks to punish only the conduct of hacking rather than
focus on the resulting harm or motivation. Each of the aforementioned
categories has different motivations or objectives, and requires a solution
that adequately addresses that particular motivation or result, rather than
a one-size-fits-all approach.
C. Endorsing a Specific Framework
The unauthorized access language that defines the CFAA creates a
sliding scale of federal illegality that puts all of the focus on the conduct
of hacking, gives too much discretion to prosecutors and police officers,
delegates power to individuals, and is too broad and vague to allow a
normal person to diligently follow the law. In order for a CFAA reform
to be effective, a more specific framework that describes exactly what is
prohibited is needed. The proscription must focus on actual, destructive
harms that pose a real threat to the security and privacy of internet users,
as well as their ability to freely communicate and to have access to
information online.
The first step in achieving this goal is to eliminate the nature of
purely prohibiting certain online conduct, and to focus more on the
harms that stem from that conduct, as well as the motivation for
engaging in such conduct. To do this, the entire framework of the statute
must be reworked, and specifically, language from § 1030(a)(2)(C),
criminalizing whoever intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . .
information from any protected computer,140 must be removed entirely,
in favor of criminalizing, specifically, the three aforementioned broad
categories of cyber-threats: (1) theft or fraud where the intent is financial
gain or profit; (2) espionage where the intent is the theft of private
information, or the result is exposure; and (3) disruption where the intent
is to cause harm through an attack orchestrated to slow, disable, or
destroy systems or networks.141 Whoever knowingly engages in actions
that fall into either the first or the third category, as well as anyone who
knowingly acquires private information, would be culpable under the
CFAA, while whoever knowingly or recklessly causes the type of private
information exposure described in the second category would be
culpable as well.
The first category of harms is fairly self-explanatory. A person
violates this provision when they knowingly engage in theft or fraud
where the motivation is financial gain. This section, however, should be
limited to actual monetary loss, rather than the idea of attributing a
140 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
141 Titch, supra note 110.
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financial value to the loss of certain information. For example, hackers
who are responsible for the Target breach would violate this section
because they sought to steal credit card information, but a user who
circumvents New York Times website to exceed their 10-articles-per-
month limit would not, regardless of whether New York Times estimated
the amount of money lost due to the circumvention. While perhaps the
aggregate effect of all of the users who circumvent New York Times for
this purpose is financially damaging and should be punished, speculative
financial losses due to improperly acquiring information should not be
addressed by the CFAA, and will not be addressed in this Note.
The exposing information provision is somewhat of an outlier
because the damage done by exposing private information is often
irreversible, while damage from theft or fraud or from disabling or
slowing essential systems can be remedied. As previously stated and as
history has indicated, once something has been posted on the internet, it
is virtually impossible to remove it completely, especially if it is private.
One need only look to the iCloud breach to recognize this unfortunate
truth.142 It is for this reason that the mens rea for exposing private
information includes recklessness, while the theft of private information
without exposure requires knowledge. Additionally, because it is so
difficult to draw a bright line that differentiates private versus public
information, this entire category requires a subjective test. Although
there are very clear examples of exposure or theft of private information,
such as the iCloud breach, less clear situations also commonly arise, such
as weevs case in which he merely facilitated the exposure of private
information that had negligently been made public by AT&T.143 These
more difficult cases demonstrate the need for a subjective test that takes
into consideration a number of factors including, but not limited to, the
nature of information that is exposed and its significance or repercussion
to the victim, the reputational or personal damage to the victim, and the
methods used to obtain the information. Private information, however,
should not include published information or articles that are public to
users with a subscription or who fall within a viewing limit, such as
JSTOR or New York Times articles, because the harm due to exposure or
acquisition in these scenarios is de minimis.
Similar to the first category, knowingly engaging in disruption that is
meant to cause harm by slowing, disabling, or destroying essential
systems is generally straightforward. However, for harms that fall into
this category, consent would be a complete defense. Conduct intended to
slow, disable, or destroy would be presumed unauthorized, so the burden
142 See Franks, supra note 120.
143 Id.; OToole, supra note 34.
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would be on the defense to demonstrate this consent. Consent can be
assessed through a multitude of factors, including, but not limited to;
whether there was a contract in which an alleged victim knowingly
consented, such as a TOS agreement; whether there was a code-based
barrier in place; whether there was verbal consent; and the relationship of
the parties. For example, many high-traffic websites use stress-testing
software that is often also used for launching DDoS attacks.144 While
launching a DDoS attack against a website would violate the statute,
when done with legitimate consent for purposes of stress-testing, it falls
into the consent exception.
This framework allows for adequate balancing and protection of the
interests of the CFAA. First, privacy is given express recognition and
protection from both, a financial and an individual standpoint. Rather
than a catchall provision, the express protection from both theft and from
private information exposure would directly address the aforementioned
privacy concerns and attitudes that have fallen through the cracks of the
CFAA. The CFAAs interest in security is also not diminished by this
framework. Because these categories are broad, more specific violations
that are already prohibited by the current CFAA can be reworked or
added into one, or several, of these categories, including current security
protections for password trafficking, extortion, or violations that involve
a government or military computer (specifically, data theft from these
government networks).145 This categorical framework would ground the
security interest in all three provisions. Finally, the interest in preserving
and facilitating a free flow of information is also expressly protected by
the third category, as well as implicitly protected by the framework itself
by excluding minor computer misuse. The wide threat of prosecution that
stems from criminalizing TOS violations and minor workarounds has the
effect of diminishing the availability of much of the information online,
and also of chilling efforts to facilitate it, illustrated precisely by Aaron
Swartzs case.146
Targeting specific harms and actual wrongdoers has the effect of
eliminating from the statute minor time- and resource-consuming,
computer misuse that should not be the focus of federal legislative
attention, such as TOS violations, an employees non-work-related
internet searches, or a typical users cookie or internet history clearing
habits. This framework would make sure only legitimate cyber-threats
are able to be charged under the statute to avoid overcriminalization.
Additionally, other potentially damaging activity that is does not relate
144 Verma, supra note 132.
145 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
146 See Constant, supra note 14.
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specifically to the interests of the CFAA, such as employee damage or
sabotage, can be better addressed under other existing laws. Furthermore,
by eliminating the sliding scale and the catchall aspect of the CFAA,
resources could be freed up and able to be used toward better
understanding, tracking, and preventing cyber-threats.
In addition to better protecting the interests of the CFAA, the
framework of proscribing specific categories of harm also corrects the
multitude of problems that currently plague the statute, including: (1)
void-for-vagueness issues; (2) delegation issues; and (3) the issue of
running contrary to general goals of criminal justice. The vagueness
problems with the CFAA stem from its absent definitions, and unclear
interpretations, of both unauthorized access and exceeding authorized
access.147 Removing this terminology and instead inserting specifically-
prohibited provisions that describe exactly what is not allowed,
eliminates this problem. Additionally, the same argument can be made
for delegation issues. By simply not allowing violations of TOS
agreements to fall under the CFAA, delegation falls squarely back on
lawmakers. Finally, a strong impact of this proposal would include its
adherence to criminal justice goals. Rather than a catchall provision that
criminalizes a broad and unclear range of activity, most of which is of no
real concern to the government, specific provisions put citizens on notice
of exactly what is prohibited. Additionally, implementing this proposal
would eliminate the clear lack of respect people feel toward a law that is
simply too broad to have any kind of deterrent effect, that is arbitrarily
and discriminatorily enforced, and that makes it nearly impossible to
carry on with daily online activities without somehow violating it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Computer networks and the internet are heavily relied upon for the
full range of activities that support our economy, political system, social
order, and communication.148 The United States national stability is
threatened when key networks are threatened, and grounding interests in
security, privacy, and a free flow of information into a statute with an
egregiously wide scope that glorifies excessive penalties is not the
appropriate solution. A comprehensive solution that specifies exactly
what is prohibited is necessary to assure that actual harmful activity,
rather than routine computer use, is criminalized, and that our rights and
interests as citizens are adequately protected. CFAA reform is necessary
147 Kerr, supra note 15.
148 George B. Delta & Jeffrey H. Matsuura, Controlling Network Access, 2013 WL
3924193 (C.C.H.), CCH Law Of Internet §10.02 at 21.
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for better understanding, preventing, apprehending, and prosecuting
hackers who pose a serious threat to the United States.
